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Rationalizing Entity Law Corporate Law and
Alternative Entities (Part 1)
By MarkJ. Loewenstei
In this article, I consider how corporate
law and limited liability company law treat
five different areas: agency authority, deriv-
ative actions, formation issues, veil pierc-
ing, and oppression of minority owners.
For each such area, I consider whether the
law varies depending on the kind of entity
involved, why that might be the case, and
whether the law should be rationalized; that
is, whether legislatures or the courts should
seek to harmonize the law across entities.
While this short article focuses primarily
on corporations and limited liability com-
panies, the issues considered here apply as
well to partnerships and, where appropri-
ate, reference is made to partnership law.
Agency Auti y
One striking difference between corpo-
rate law and the law of alternative entities
relates to basic principles of agency law.
Does the person purporting to act on behalf
of the entity have the authority to bind the
entity? Corporate statutes are not helpful
in resolving this question. Typically, these
statutes provide that corporate officers have
such authority as is set forth in the bylaws
or in a resolution of the board of directors
(e.g., MBCA § 8.41). By contrast, alterna-
tive entity statutes - partnership and LLC
acts - typically provide a statutory basis
for concluding that an agent of the entity
possessed the necessary authority to bind
the entity. The 1996 version of the Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act (the ULL-
CA 1996) is typical in this regard, provid-
ing:
Each member [of a member managed lim-
ited liability company] is an agent of the
limited liability company for the purpose
of its business, and an act of a member, in-
cluding the signing of an instrument in the
company's name, for apparently carrying
on in the ordinary course the company's
business or business of the kind carried on
by the company binds the company, unless
the member had no authority to act for the
company in the particular matter and the
person with whom the member was deal-
ing knew or had notice that the member
lacked authority.
Such statutory provisions clothe the
members with actual authority to bind the
LLC, subject to action by the company to
limit that authority. This provides some
level of comfort to those who transact busi-
ness with an LLC, while a person dealing
with a corporate officer does so, arguably
at least, at his or her peril.
The approach of ULLCA 1996, though
sensible and reflective of the law in many
jurisdictions, has been rejected in the 2006
version of the Uniform Limited Liabil-
ity Company Act (ULLCA 2006) and the
ABA's Revised Prototype LLC Act (Proto-
type) in favor of the corporate model, lim-
iting the authority of the actor to that set
forth in the operating agreement. While the
statutory law currently suggests a sharp dif-
ference between corporate law and the law
of alternative entities, ULLCA 2006 and
the Prototype suggest a trend in the direc-
tion of harmonization. Only time will tell
if state legislatures (presumably prompted
by bar association committees) will be per-
suaded to abandon the formulation in their
partnership and limited liability company
acts for the corporate model. It would make
sense to do so.
One recent case, Cain Family Farm L.P
v. Schrader Real Estate & Auction Co.,
Inc., 991 N.E.2d 971 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)
illustrates the potential contrast between
corporate and LLC law. In this case, a fam-
ily limited partnership owned farm land
that was managed by a limited liability
company, the general partner of the family
limited partnership. The limited partners
and the members of the LLC were four
siblings, and they decided to sell the farm.
They hired a firm to handle the transaction,
but agreed among themselves that no sale
could take place in the absence of a unani-
mous agreement among the four. One of
the four siblings (Candace) took the lead
and approved a sale without consulting
her siblings, who then filed a declaratory
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judgment action to determine whether the
sale was binding on the limited partner-
ship. The court held that it was, because the
complaining siblings never communicated
to any potential buyers that Candace lacked
the authority act on behalf of the LLC/gen-
eral partner. More importantly, the business
of the LLC was to manage the family lim-
ited partnership and her actions (approving
a sale) were consistent with the carrying of
the business of the LLC in the usual way.
Thus, by virtue of the LLC act in Indiana,
Candace had the apparent authority to act
on behalf of the LLC/general partner and,
consequently, to bind the family limited
partnership. By contrast, if title to the prop-
erty were held in a corporate name, the
president of the corporation would not have
the apparent authority to sell the property,
although, by virtue of the bylaws or board
action, might have the actual authority to
do so.
Cain Family illustrates how corporate
and LLC law might diverge, with the for-
mer affording less agency authority to key
actors than the latter. The trend noted above
may close this gap, which would be a sen-
sible harmonization.
Derivative Actions
Universal Demand v. Demand Futility
Corporate law on derivative actions is far
from uniform. For instance, some states re-
quire that demand be made in all instances,
known as "universal demand" (see, e.g.,
MBCA § 7.41), while other states (gener-
ally by judicial decision) excuse demand if
demand would be futile (see, e.g., Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984)). Alter-
native entity law tends to embrace the de-
mand futility concept, at least in statutory
formulations. For instance, ULLCA 1996
provides, in § 1101:
A member of a limited liability company
may maintain an action in the right of the
company if the members or managers hav-
ing authority to do so have refused to com-
mence the action or an effort to cause those
members or managers to commence the ac-
tion is not likely to succeed.
ULLCA 2006 has also adopted the de-
mand futility idea, while the Prototype has
adopted the concept of universal demand,
similar to the MBCA. There is not an ob-
vious reason why corporate and LLC law
should diverge on this point and the de-
mand requirement presents an opportunity
for harmonization.
Fee Shifting
Under the MBCA (Sec. 7.46), a court
may order attorneys' fees in favor of either
party: for plaintiff "if [the court] finds that
the proceeding has resulted in a substantial
benefit to the corporation," and for defen-
dant "if it finds that the proceeding was
commenced or maintained without reason-
able cause or for an improper purpose."
ULLCA 1996 and early LLC acts tended
to allow attorneys' fees only for successful
plaintiffs. As in other areas, ULLCA 2006
and the Prototype have embraced the ap-
proach of the MBCA, allowing either side
to recover attorneys' fees. This is similar to
the state of the law with respect to the de-
mand requirement.
Standing of Creditors to Maintain a De-
rivative Action
Whether a creditor has standing to main-
tain a derivative action is a function of
statutory interpretation. In Delaware, for
instance, creditors have been granted stand-
ing to maintain a derivative action when the
corporation is insolvent. (No. Amer Catho-
lic Educ. Programming Foundation, Inc.
v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007)).
The relevant Delaware and MBCA statu-
tory provisions are similar, providing that a
derivative action may be commenced by a
person who was a shareholder at the time of
the conduct complained of or became one
"through transfer by operation of law from
one who was a shareholder at that time."
What these statutory provisions do not say
is that a derivative action may only be com-
menced by a shareholder. The Delaware
courts have noted this omission in ruling
that only limited partners and members
of limited liability companies, to the ex-
clusion of creditors in those entities, may
maintain derivative actions. The relevant
provision of the Delaware LLC Act, 6 Del.
C. § 18-1001, provides, in the section titled
"Proper Plaintiff":
In a derivative action, the plaintiff must be
a member or an assignee of a limited liabil-
ity company interest at the time of bringing
the action and: (1) At the time of the trans-
action of which the plaintiff complains; or
(2) The plaintiff's status as a member or
an assignee of a limited liability company
interest had devolved upon the plaintiff by
operation of law or pursuant to the terms
of a limited liability company agreement
from a person who was a member or an as-
signee of a limited liability company inter-
est at the time of the transaction. (emphasis
added).
While this section looks similar to the
Delaware (and MBCA) provision, the in-
clusion of the word "must" led the court
to a different conclusion. The Delaware
Chancery court went on to rationalize the
difference in the treatment of a creditor of
an LLC as compared to a corporate credi-
tor: the former has more ways to protect
itself contractually. The court noted that,
for instance, an operating agreement can
provide rights to creditors and can expand
the duties that managers owe to creditors
when the LLC is insolvent. While the claim
that creditors can more easily protect them-
selves when dealing with an LLC may be
questioned (the two cited examples could
have corporate analogs), there is no doubt
that the difference in statutory language
justifies the difference in outcome.
This is an area where harmonization
would make sense. Either creditors of all
entities should have standing to maintain a
derivative action, or none should.
Individual v, Entity Injury
The law is clear that derivative actions
are only available to address injury to the
entity. If the injury in question is suffered
directly by the equity owner, such as the
failure of a corporation to honor a con-
tractual commitment to a shareholder, that
action must be brought as a direct action.
The structure of an alternative entity, as
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compared to a corporation, means that, in
some instances, the nature of the injury is
characterized differently in the two types of
entities. The classic example of this differ-
ence is reflected in Anglo Amer Sec. Fund
v. S.R. Global Intern'1 Fund, 829 A.2d 143
(Del. Ch. 2003). In this case, the limited
partners sued a limited partnership, its gen-
eral partner, and the auditor of the limited
partnership alleging a variety of claims
flowing from the general partner's alleg-
edly wrongful withdrawal of funds from
its capital account. Ruling on a motion to
dismiss, the court held that the limited part-
ners' claims were not derivative claims, but
direct claims. The court stated that "the test
for distinguishing direct from derivative
claims in the context of a limited partner-
ship is substantially the same as that used
when the underlying entity is a corporation.
In both instances the determination is made
by careful application of a rather nuanced
test. The test looks to the nature of the in-
jury and to the nature of the remedy that
could result if the plaintiffs are successful."
The court concluded, however, that the
claims made by the limited partners in this
case "state merely a diminution in value of
the Fund's assets, which injures the limited
partners only in proportion to their pro rata
interest in the Fund," and are consequently
direct claims. By contrast, the same claim
made by corporate shareholders would be
derivative claims.
Thus, at least in this area of derivative ac-
tions, harmonization seems inappropriate.
The different nature of corporations and
alternative entities, in particular the capital
account feature of alternative entities, means
that, in some instances, equity owners will
suffer a direct loss from a breach of fiduciary
duty by those in control of the entity.
Formation Issues
A number of judicial decisions have
recognized the concepts of "de facto cor-
poration" and "corporation by estoppel."
The former concept involves a good faith
or colorable attempt to comply with the
applicable corporate statute and the use
of the corporate power at a time when the
incorporation was not perfected because,
for instance, the secretary of state rejected
the filing. Jurisdictions that recognized
this doctrine would treat the corporation
as though it were validly formed, with the
consequence that the persons exercising
corporate powers could avoid personal li-
ability. Under the concept of corporation
by estoppel, a third party who knew that
its counter-party had not yet formed cor-
poration could be estopped from imposing
personal liability on those who exercised
corporate powers if the third party know-
ingly acted as though a corporation had
been validly formed.
Corporate law has moved away from the
concept of de facto corporations, in part
because it has become easier to form cor-
porations. For instance, the Official Com-
ment to Section 146 of the 1969 version
of the MBCA stated that the section was
"designed to prohibit the application of
any theory of de facto incorporation." Nev-
ertheless, the most recent version of the
MBCA includes a provision that may be
interpreted as reviving the doctrine, at least
in part. Section 2.4 of the MBCA provides:
All persons purporting to act as or on be-
half of a corporation, knowing there was
no incorporation under this Act, are jointly
and severally liable for all liabilities cre-
ated while so acting. (emphasis added).
Arguably, a person who filed or attempted
to file articles of incorporation with the secre-
tary of state and did not know that the filing
had been rejected would not bear personal
liability under this section. If that argument
were to prevail, the result would be similar to
that under the de facto doctrine.
LLC acts tend not to address the issue of
personal liability of members for actions
taken before the LLC has been formed, and
courts have looked to corporate law to fill the
void. (See, e.g., Duray Development, LLC v.
Perrin, 792 N.W.2d 749 (Mich. App. 2010)
recognizing that both de facto corporation
and corporation by estoppel doctrines could
be applied to LLCs).
In this area, then, corporate statutes are in
conflict with one another on whether the doc-
trines are recognized, and when the issue aris-
es for an LLC, courts rely on corporate case
law. This is an area ripe for harmonization.
Veil Piercing
Veil piercing in corporate law is a doc-
trine that is judicially created. Corporate
statutes do not address the issue, and prec-
edents recognizing the doctrine go back to
the nineteenth century. The legal theory
that underpins the veil piercing doctrine
is that operating in the corporate form is
a "privilege" (presumably granted by stat-
ute), and if that privilege is abused, the li-
ability shield will not be recognized by the
courts. Courts will find abuse if, for in-
stance, those in control of the corporation
do not adhere to the statutory formalities or
otherwise fail to treat the corporation as a
separate legal entity.
Alternative entities do not operate with
the same formalities as do corporations.
They are not required to hold annual meet-
ings, have a board of directors, appoint of-
ficers, maintain minutes of meetings, etc.
Rather, alternative entities are contractual
entities, having such formalities, if any, as
the parties agree to in their foundational
agreements. Nevertheless, courts have
readily applied the veil piercing precedents
from corporate law to LLCs and, recently,
to a limited partnership. These cases have
recognized that failure to adhere to formali-
ties cannot be a factor in applying the doc-
trine and have, instead, focused on whether
the individuals controlling the entity have
treated the entity as their alter ego. ULLCA
2006, while not expressly providing for
veil piercing, does so indirectly, providing,
in Section 304(b): "The failure of a limited
liability company to observe any particular
formalities relating to the exercise of its
powers or management of its activities is
not a ground for imposing liability on the
members or managers for the debts, obliga-
tions, or other liabilities of the company."
The Official Comment following this sec-
tion confirms this: "This subsection does
not preclude consideration of another key
piercing factor - disregard by an entity's
owners of the entity's economic separate-
ness from the owners."
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In the area of veil piercing, the courts are
harmonizing the law, and justifiably so.
Oppression
Unlike veil piercing, shareholder oppres-
sion is not a concept wholly created by the
judiciary, but it is close. In a closely held cor-
poration, if the majority disappoints the rea-
sonable expectations of the minority share-
holders, those minority shareholders may
have a cause of action to address that conduct.
There is some statutory basis for this claim,
as corporate statutes typically provide that, in
a proceeding by a shareholder, a court may
dissolve a corporation if the shareholder es-
tablishes that "the directors or those in control
of the corporation have acted, are acting, or
will act in a manner that is illegal, oppres-
sive or fraudulent." (MBCA Sec. 14.30(a)(2)
(ii)) (emphasis added). The courts have said
that disappointing the reasonable expecta-
tions of the minority shareholder is oppres-
sive conduct, entitling the shareholder to a
decree of dissolution. But some courts have
concluded that if the minority shareholder
proves oppressive conduct (thus entitled to
dissolution), the court has the equitable pow-
er to order a remedy other than dissolution.
In Massachusetts, which does not even have
such an oppression provision, the courts have
found a general equitable power to address
oppressive conduct with a remedy.
While there are few cases in which mem-
bers of an LLC have sought a cause of action
for oppression, the trend seems to be that the
courts will recognize such a claim, Delaware
being an exception. Many LLC statutes have
a dissolution provision that is similar to the
corporate provision quoted above, and that
provides the necessary support for applying
the doctrine.
As in the area of veil piercing, oppression
is an example of judicially created harmoni-
zation. But just as veil piercing does not quite
fit the LLC form, oppression is an even looser
fit. LLCs are contractual entities and, argu-
ably, parties can bargain for such protections
as they desire. If the operating agreement
identifies the expectations of the minority
members, then their remedy, if any, for not
receiving those expectations ought to lie in an
action for breach of contract. This is an area
in which harmonization is not justified.
Conclusion
Corporate law and the law of alternative
entities need not be harmonized solely for
the sake of harmonization. I have tried to
show some instances in which harmoniza-
tion has already occurred, others where it
makes sense for it to occur, and still oth-
ers where harmonization makes little sense.
While the end of the 20th century saw a
significant increase in the number of enti-
ties available to the entrepreneur, the chal-
lenge of the 21st century will be to consider
whether the legal differences among those
entities makes sense and, if not, how the
law should be harmonized.
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